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Abstract 
 
This study explores the major value-drivers of business-to-consumer (“B2C”) Internet 
companies’ share prices both before and after the “bursting of the Internet bubble” in the 
spring of 2000.  Although many market observers had predicted that the bubble would 
eventually burst (e.g., Perkins and Perkins 1999), the ultimate and previously unanswered 
challenge lay identifying which stocks would fall and which ones would survive the 
shakeout.  We develop an empirical valuation model and provide evidence that the 
Internet stocks that this model suggests were relatively over-valued prior to the Internet 
stock market correction experienced relatively larger drops in their price-to-sales ratios 
when the bubble burst.  This result is robust to the inclusion of competing explanatory 
variables suggested by the economics literature related to industry rationalizations. 
 
We also investigate a number of additional issues related to the rapidly changing Internet 
world.  First, we provide descriptive evidence of the correlation between monthly stock 
returns and contemporaneous and lagged Nielsen/Netratings web traffic metrics (both 
levels and changes).  We then undertake a factor analysis on the set of Nielsen/Netratings 
raw web metrics with a view to synthesizing the data into a parsimonious set of 
orthogonal web performance measures.  Our factor analysis results in the extraction of 
three factors that capture the most relevant dimensions of website performance: (1) reach, 
(2) “stickiness”, and (3) customer loyalty.  Our findings suggest that all three web 
performance measures are value-relevant to the share prices of Internet companies in 
each of 1999 and 2000.  Our findings of significance for the year 2000 contradict the 
recent claims of some analysts that web traffic measures are no longer important.  We 
also explore the valuation role of our proxy for B2C companies’ ability to sustain their 
current rate of “cash burn” and find that this proxy is a significant value-driver in each of 
1999 and 2000.  Finally, our results suggest that investors adopted a more skeptical 
attitude towards expenditures on intangible investments as the Internet sector began to 
mature.  Consistent with the results of prior studies in other knowledge asset based 
industries, we find that investors appear to implicitly capitalize product development 
(R&D) and advertising expenses (customer acquisition costs) during the “bubble” period 
when the market was more optimistic about the prospects of B2C companies.  However, 
neither marketing expenses nor product development costs are implicitly capitalized into 
value, on average, subsequent to the shakeout in the spring of 2000.   Overall, our study 
provides a preliminary view of the shakeout and maturation of one of the most important 
New Economy industries to emerge to date – the Internet. 
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A Rude Awakening:  Internet Shakeout in 2000 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
The market capitalization of U.S. publicly traded Internet stocks plummeted in value by 
approximately 45% from February to May 2000, as measured by the ISDEX, an 
authoritative and widely cited Internet stock index.1  Although the Internet sector was 
badly mauled from this “bursting of the bubble,” it remains a very significant component 
of the U.S. economy.  The market capitalization of U.S. publicly traded Internet stocks 
was estimated to be $1.3 trillion dollars prior to the shakeout (Barron’s Online, March 
20, 2000) and $843 billion as of June 2000 (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, June 2000).   
 
Many market observers had predicted that the “Internet Bubble” would eventually burst 
(most famously, Perkins and Perkins 1999).  However, the ultimate and previously 
unanswered challenge lay in identifying which stocks would fall and which ones would 
survive the shakeout.  We develop an empirical valuation model and provide evidence 
that the Internet stocks that this model suggests were relatively over-valued prior to the 
Internet stock market correction experienced relatively larger drops in their price-to-sales 
ratios when the bubble burst.  This result is robust to the inclusion of competing 
explanatory variables suggested by prior research in the economics literature related to 
industry shakeouts.   
 
We also examine a number of additional issues and questions raised in the fast-changing 
Internet world.  We begin our analysis with an examination of the simple pairwise 
correlations between monthly stock returns and contemporaneous and lagged raw web 
traffic metrics (both levels and changes) for each of 1999 and 2000.  The correlations 
provide us with descriptive evidence related to the market’s speed of adjustment to these 
widely cited non-financial performance measures.  This investigation is timely and 
                                                 
1 The ISDEX (http://www.wsrn.com/apps/ISDEX/) fell from a high of approximately 1100 in February 
2000 to a low of about 600 in May of 2000. 
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important because the relation between stock returns and raw web traffic measures such 
as “reach”2 has recently come under considerable scrutiny and criticism.3 
 
Our study proceeds with an investigation into the value-drivers of publicly traded 
business-to-consumer (“B2C”) Internet stocks in each of 1999 and 2000.  Given the 
changing marketplace, the continued absence of positive profits for many companies in 
this sector, and the increasing skepticism of investors about the prospects of Internet 
companies, the search for the fundamental value drivers of these companies is of 
paramount importance to investors and managers.  Several recent studies (e.g., Trueman, 
Wong, and Zhang 1999 (“TWZ”), Hand 2000(B), and Rajgopal, Kotha, and 
Venkatachalam 2000 (“RKV”)) have documented a positive relation during the “bubble” 
period between Internet companies' market values and various combinations of financial 
statement variables and web traffic measures, particularly those indicating “reach”.   
 
Our study builds upon and extends the previously cited Internet studies in several ways.  
First, we undertake a factor analysis on an extensive set of raw web metrics with a view 
to synthesizing the data into a parsimonious set of relevant and orthogonal web traffic 
performance measures.  Our factor analysis results in the extraction of three factors that 
capture the most relevant dimensions of website performance: (1) reach, (2) “stickiness,” 
and (3) customer loyalty.  Our “reach” factor encompasses the extent to which the 
Internet company is able to attract unique visitors.  Website “stickiness” captures the 
notion of how long visitors stay at the site once they’re there, and is driven primarily by 
web traffic metrics measuring the average time spent at the site per visit and the average 
number of pages viewed per visit.  “Customer loyalty” is a third distinct measure of web 
company performance, and this factor is driven primarily by the average number of visits 
to the site per unique visitor per period.   Our findings suggest that all three web 
performance measures are value-relevant to the share prices of Internet companies in 
each of 1999 and 2000.  Our findings of significance for the year 2000 contradict the 
recent claims of some analysts that web traffic measures are no longer important. 
 
                                                 
2 Reach is defined as the number of unique visitors to a web site, and is usually stated as a percentage of the 
(total or active) web surfing population.   
3 See, for example, “Lyin’ Eyeballs” by Scott Wooley (Forbes, August 7, 2000). 
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We further extend the prior literature by examining the valuation role of our proxy for 
Internet companies’ ability to sustain their current rate of  “cash burn.”  Recent industry 
reports suggest that many money-losing Internet companies are quickly depleting their 
stores of cash and that the pending liquidity crises are threatening the very viability of 
these companies as going concerns (see, e.g., Barron’s Online, March 20, 2000).   The 
spring of 2000 carnage in the market for Internet stocks is alleged to have been driven, in 
part, by investors’ concerns about Internet companies’ cash flow deficits (Nelson 2000).  
We find that our proxy for the firms’ ability to sustain their current rate of “cash burn” is 
significantly associated with the price-to-sales ratios of the Internet companies in our 
B2C sample in each of 1999 and 2000. 
 
We also examine the valuation role of a meaningfully expanded set of financial statement 
variables relative to those that were considered in prior studies and provide some 
evidence on the importance of strategic alliances in explaining the value of Internet 
stocks.  Our findings suggest that the market treats expenditures on marketing expenses 
and product development costs as assets rather than current expenses in assessing B2C 
companies’ price-to-sales ratios, but only during the period prior to the bursting of the 
bubble.  We also find that alliances with AOL are positively valued in 1999, but are not 
significant determinants of price-to-sales in 2000.  Consistent with some industry 
observers’ criticisms of internet companies’ over-investments in expensive alliances, we 
find that the total number of strategic alliances entered into is negatively associated with 
B2C companies’ price-to-sales ratios in each of 1999 and 2000. 
 
We thus focus in this study on the dramatic changes in investors’ perceptions about the 
prospects of B2C Internet companies that have taken place during the first half of 2000, 
and in particular on the March-April 2000 fallout.  Of course, this is not the end of the 
story, as the Internet sector continues to mature and evolve.  However, we believe that it 
is important to carefully follow the evolutionary process in order to learn whatever we 
can about the emergence, growth, shakeout, and eventual stabilization of one of the most 
important New Economy industries to materialize to date – the Internet. 
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The balance of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief background 
related to the economics of the Internet industry, and Section 3 develops the hypotheses 
to be tested. Section 4 discusses the collection of our sample and provides a description 
of the data and companies included in our study.  Section 5 describes the pairwise 
correlations between monthly stock market returns and measures of web traffic, while 
Section 6 presents the results of our investigation into the value drivers of B2C Internet 
stocks in each of 1999 and 2000.  An empirical analysis of the Internet “shakeout” is 
presented in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes with a summary of our findings and a 
discussion of future work. 
 
 
2. Background to the Internet Industry  
 
There are currently over 400 Internet companies trading on U.S. stock exchanges4, with 
many more about to go public.5 The total market value of these companies is over $1 
trillion dollars (Barron’s Online, March 20, 2000 and, on an ongoing basis, by inference 
from the ISDEX Internet stock index at http://www.wsrn.com/apps/ISDEX/).  Since its 
inception in 1994, the Internet sector has evolved from a nascent stage industry to 
become the third-largest technology sector by market value.  By 1999 the market wealth 
creation by the Internet, on an equivalent basis, exceeded that created by the PC (Perkins 
and Perkins 1999).  Indeed, the 5-year old Internet sector is the second leading 
technology sector in terms of wealth creation, falling only slightly behind the more 
mature software industry (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 2000).   
 
Similar to most high-tech start-up businesses, Internet companies generally require 
significant up-front capital investments in order to establish both the technological 
architecture and the critical mass of customers that will be necessary to ultimately attain 
                                                 
4 The InternetStockList (http://www.internetnews.com/stocks/list/) provides a listing of over 280 
companies that went public prior to approximately the fourth quarter of 1999.  IPO-Alert  (www.ipo-
alert.com) together with the IPODEX (http://www.internetnews.com/stocks/ipodex/) reference an 
additional set of over 150 Internet companies that have gone public since the autumn of 1999. 
5 See http://www.internetnews.com/stocks/ipo/ for a list of over 100 additional companies that are “on 
deck” (i.e., about to go public).   
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profitability.6  Accordingly, most Internet companies report large expenditures on product 
development (sometimes referred to as R&D) and sales/marketing expenses as they 
attempt to grow themselves into profitability.  It has been widely (and accurately) 
reported in the popular press that most Internet companies are still not profitable.  In the 
absence of an established history of profit-generating ability, the “top line” (i.e., 
revenues) has become an important focal point in the financial analysis of companies in 
this sector.  Most Internet analysts (including venture capitalists and others who are 
interested in the performance evaluation of web companies) have also come to rely upon 
non-financial measures of web traffic activity as indicators of the current performance 
and future cash generating ability of these intangible asset based firms.   
 
Following the classification scheme provided by Wall Street Research Net © WSRN.com 
(http://www.wsrn.com/apps/internetstocks/), the Internet industry can be divided into the 
following sectors: e-tail, content/communities, financial news/services, portal, services, 
consultants/designers, e-commerce enablers, Internet security, isp/access, performance 
software, advertising, and speed/bandwidth.  Of these sectors, only the first five are 
considered to have business models for which web traffic plays an important economic 
role. Entities in the e-tail, content/communities, financial news/services, portal, and 
services sectors are business-to-consumer (or “B2C”) companies that are expected to earn 
revenues either directly or indirectly by attracting web traffic to their sites.   
 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
 
3.1 The Value-Relevance of Non-Financial Information 
 
We investigate whether two types of non-financial data, web traffic measures and 
strategic alliances, are value-relevant for the share prices of Internet stocks.   
 
                                                 
6 The Internet may be viewed as an extreme example of Metcalfe’s Law.  Robert Metcalfe, inventor of the 
Ethernet and founder of 3Com, established the “law” which states that the value of any network increases 
by the square of the number of people using it (Perkins and Perkins 1999). 
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3.1.1 Web Metrics  
 
Web traffic measures have become standard Internet company performance benchmarks 
that are now commonly reported in the business press, voluntarily disclosed by 
companies at the time of their earnings announcements, and frequently mentioned as 
valuation parameters in analysts’ reports. Prior Internet studies (TWZ, RKV, and Hand 
2000(B)) have provided evidence on the value-relevance of raw web metrics 
(particularly, reach or unique audience) for Internet stocks prior to the “bursting of the 
bubble.”  
 
We expand upon this prior web metric research by investigating several additional 
hypotheses.  First, given the plethora of web traffic metrics that are available to us from 
the Nielson/Netratings database, we select a parsimonious set of three orthogonal web 
traffic factors through the use of factor analysis and investigate the separate valuation 
role of these three different dimensions of web traffic performance.7     Second, we 
examine the value-relevance of these three web performance factors both before and after 
the Internet market “correction” in March-April of 2000.  This question is pertinent 
because some Wall Street practitioners are beginning to suggest that web traffic metrics 
are no longer important.8 
 
Three key dimensions of traffic generating performance are: the attraction of new visitors 
(or “eyeballs”) to a website; the retention of visitors at the site, conditional on having 
gotten them to the site for a visit; and the ability to generate repeat visits from surfers 
who have been attracted to the site in the past.  These three dimensions of web traffic 
performance are commonly referred to as “reach”, “stickiness”, and “customer loyalty”, 
respectively. 
 
                                                 
7 This initial selection of factors is of importance beyond our subsequent valuation analyses.  A reading of 
Internet analysts’ valuation reports suggests that they treat the various raw web traffic metrics as orthogonal 
performance measures, and that they are seemingly unaware of the potentially confounding influence of the 
correlations between the raw metrics. 
8 For example, in their discussion of Internet stock valuation models, UBS Warburg’s Global Equity 
Research group stated in May 2000 that “(They) … favour cash flow and EBIT but are disenchanted with 
the commonly used hits – eyeballs and page-views – as statistical measures of future value creation” (UBS 
Warburg).  
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Reach: 
Reach is generally defined as the number of unique individuals who visit a site, stated as 
a percentage of the (active or total) websurfing population.  Reach is the web metric that 
is most frequently cited in the business press and has been studied by prior researchers 
(e.g., Trueman, Wong, and Zhang 1999 (“TWZ”), Hand 2000(B), and Rajgopal, Kotha, 
and Venkatachalam 2000 (“RKV”)).  As a performance measure, reach provides an 
indication of the scale of the web property’s visitor base, which is a measure of how 
successful the company has been at attracting web surfers to their site.  Given the 
importance of scale in the B2C sector, our proxy for reach is expected to be positively 
associated with the value of B2C Internet companies.   
 
Stickiness: 
Website “stickiness” generally refers to a site’s ability to retain a surfer at their site once 
a customer has arrived there.  Web site “stickiness” is a desirable quality because a 
“sticky” site may be able to generate higher advertising rates from advertisers who 
believe that visitors are more likely to spend sufficient time at the site to read, retain, 
and/or otherwise be influenced by the ads that are placed there.   
 
Customer Loyalty: 
Customer loyalty generally refers to a website’s ability to generate repeat visits from 
surfers who have previously visited their site.  This metric is relevant because a website’s 
ability to re-attract current visitors is expected to be an important determinant of its 
ability to sustain, and/or ultimately grow to, the critical mass of traffic that is necessary to 
attain profitability.9   
 
Both stickiness and customer loyalty reflect important dimensions of the site’s brand 
value and are expected to be positively associated with the market values of Internet 
stocks. 
 
                                                 
9 For example, in a discussion of Amazon’s reported first-quarter results from operations, Motley Fool 
analyst, David Gardner, claims (after mentioning that sales rose 95% from the prior year’s comparative 
quarter) that:  “The most important metric (for me) remains orders from repeat customers, and these 
represented 76% of all orders in the period” (Gardner 2000, emphasis Gardner’s). 
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3.1.2 Strategic Alliances 
 
Strategic business alliances, aimed at sharing technology and other core competencies 
(e.g., marketing and/or existing customer base), are becoming increasingly common in 
the Internet sector.  Analysts’ reports and anecdotal evidence suggest that such strategic 
alliances are potentially important value drivers for Internet stocks.10  RKV have 
previously examined the role of alliances as possible determinants of reach.  We extend 
their work by investigating more directly the role of alliances as potential value drivers 
for Internet stocks. 
 
We also examine whether strategic alliances remain positively valued by the market in 
2000.  This investigation is prompted by post-bubble reports in the business press that the 
previously hyped strategic alliances have generally not lived up to expectations.11 
 
3.2 The Value-Relevance of Financial Information 
 
The “common wisdom”, as represented in the business press, is that, with the exception 
of revenues, traditional financial statement information is not relevant for the valuation of 
Internet stock prices.  Hand (2000A) was the first to document that financial statement 
data are significantly associated with the market values of publicly-traded Internet 
companies.  However, Hand’s (2000A) valuation regressions do not include the often-
cited web traffic metrics as explanatory variables (or “value-drivers”), and hence his 
findings are potentially subject to a correlated omitted variables bias.  TWZ, Hand 
2000(B), and RKV all investigate the value-relevance of various subsets of financial 
                                                 
10 For example, although the Internet Stock Index dropped 3.26% on October 12th, 1999, the share prices of 
several companies that announced alliances significantly increased in value:  Stamps.com leaped 2 ½ to 35 
after reaching a deal with IBM Corp. to put its postage software on IBM’s Aptivas; E.piphany Inc. soared 
10 11/16 to 62 11/16 as they sealed a deal with Amazon.com; and Phone.com gained an additional 9 13/16 
to 214 13/16 as its shares continued to benefit from the prior day’s announced deal with Ireland’s Apion 
Ltd. (The Internet Stock Report, http://www.internetstockreport.com/close/article/0,1785,216901,00.html). 
11 For example, The Industry Standard reported in May 2000 that “as recently as six months ago, many e-
commerce companies saw prominent portal alliances as a sign that they had arrived – a guarantee of traffic, 
sales and eventual success. But now many say the partnerships have been disappointing, and they are re-
evaluating their use of marketing dollars” (http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,14412,00.html). 
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statement data, conditional upon the inclusion of a web metric for “reach” in the 
valuation regressions.  The results from these prior studies vis a vis the value-relevance of 
particular financial statement variables are somewhat mixed.    
 
In the early euphoric days of the Internet bubble, aggressive spending by B2C companies 
on acquiring customers and on developing the technological architecture and product 
offerings necessary to “grow to a profitable scale” were heralded by analysts and market 
commentators.12   Accordingly, and following the prior literature related to start-up 
industries (e.g., Amir and Lev (1996)) and R&D-intensive firms (e.g., Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996)), we examine the value relevance of two categories of Internet 
companies’ expenditures related to the acquisition of intangible assets:  marketing 
expenses; and product development and R&D expenses.  We hypothesize that both of 
these variables will be positively valued by the market in their determination of B2C 
stock prices during the pre-crash “bubble” period.   
 
3.3 Investigating the Role of “Cash Burn” 
 
The new millennium coincided with a dramatic reassessment by investors of the viability 
and prospects of Internet companies.  As early as January 2000, influential sources such 
as Barron’s and Forrester Research predicted that the availability of cash would 
determine the fate of many Internet companies.  Accordingly, we extend our investigation 
of the value-drivers of Internet companies to examine the value-relevance of a proxy for 
the companies’ ability to sustain their current level of “cash burn.”  We predict that 
companies with high rates of cash burn relative to their current stores of cash will be less 
highly valued and more susceptible to a shakeout. 
 
                                                 
12 For example, the Director of Research for on-line investment bank Wit Capital suggests that the 
“operating model (of Internet companies) derives from the notion that the most capital-intensive part of 
many Internet businesses are sales and marketing-related expenses such as customer acquisition costs.  It is 
significant that those expenses tend to decline sharply as a percentage of revenues after reaching critical 
mass or market leadership positions.  We believe strongly that Internet companies that achieve market 
leadership should generate proportionately lower variable costs over their operating lifetimes, and should 
therefore produce consistently stronger operating margins compared with those companies that do not 
enjoy the benefit of market leadership” (Cohen 1999). 
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3.4 Predicting the Shakeout 
 
The 45% drop in the ISDEX Internet stock index in the spring of 2000 was not entirely 
unanticipated.  Many market observers had predicted that the “bubble” would eventually 
burst (e.g., Perkins and Perkins 1999), and e-tail companies were identified as being 
particularly susceptible to fallout.  Of course, the ultimate and still largely unanswered 
challenge lay in identifying which stocks would fall and which ones would survive the 
shakeout.   
 
The extant industrial economics literature identifies several variables that are commonly 
associated with firm failure during periods of an industry shakeout, including failure to 
keep up with technological innovation, firm age, and firm size (Klepper and Simons, 
2000).  In the short time since the inception of the Internet industry, there has not yet 
been a significant identifiable technological innovation that would catapult some 
companies to success and others to failure.  Accordingly, we investigate the role of firm 
age, firm size, cash burn, and e-tail sector membership as possible determinants of 
shakeout.  A contribution to the industry shakeout literature is our test of whether B2C 
companies that were “over valued” on a relative basis (defined as having a positive 
residual in a price-to-sales valuation regression) would experience relatively larger drops 
in their price-to-sales ratios when the bubble burst. 
 
 
4. Sample Selection and Data Description 
 
4.1 Sample 
 
The population of publicly-traded Internet companies was identified from a 
comprehensive list, the InternetStockList™, provided by Internet.com 
(http://www.internetnews.com/stocks/list/).  The publicly traded Internet companies were 
then separated into industry segments based upon the classification scheme provided by 
Wall Street Research Net © WSRN.com (http://www1.wsrn.com/icom_index/index.xpl). 
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Because we are interested in the association between web traffic metrics and market 
values (prices and returns), we limit our sample of Internet companies to those for which 
we expect web traffic measures to be economically important.  Specifically, Internet 
companies were included in the initial sample if they fell into the following business-to-
consumer (“B2C”) sectors:  e-tail, content/communities, financial news/services, portal, 
and services.  Due to data constraints, Internet companies were also excluded from the 
sample if their initial public offering took place after August 31, 1999.  The results 
reported in this paper are based upon 84 publicly traded Internet companies for which 
stock market prices, financial statement data, and web traffic measures were available for 
at least one quarter within 1999 or the first half of 2000.  A list of the sample companies 
is provided in Table 1. 
 
4.2 Data Description 
 
The daily stock prices and market values of the firms included in our sample were 
obtained from the Datastream database.  Financial statement data for companies included 
in the valuation regressions were hand-collected from corporate quarterly financial 
statements filed with the SEC.  Information related to strategic alliances was derived 
from the Securities Data Corp. (“SDC”) database. 
 
Web traffic measures were obtained from the Nielsen/Netratings “Audience 
Measurement” database.  Nielsen/Netratings, together with MediaMetrix and PC Data, 
are the leading providers of commercial web traffic databases.  Nine web traffic measures 
are included in the Nielsen/Netratings database:  unique audience (the number of unique 
web surfers who have viewed the site during the month), active reach (the percentage of 
active web surfers who viewed the site during the month), universal reach (the estimated 
percentage of the universe of web surfers who have viewed the site during the month), 
rank by unique audience for the month, the total number of pages viewed by web surfers 
during the month, the number of visits to the site per unique visitor during the month, the 
average time spent at the site per person, and the percentage of pages that were viewed 
from browser cache during the month. 
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The Nielsen/Netratings data is available on a monthly basis beginning with the month of 
February 1999.  The database includes audience measures for all web properties that meet 
the “statistical cutoff” for that particular month.13  Some sample companies may not 
make the cutoff for the Nielsen/Netratings listings in any particular month, but are 
otherwise included in the database for earlier and/or later months.  In such instances, 
based upon the Nielsen/Netratings criteria for inclusion, we assign a value of zero to the 
web metrics for those firm-month observations. 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
A listing of the Internet companies included in our initial sample, together with their 
market values at December 31, 1999, February 28, 2000, and May 31, 2000, respectively, 
is provided in Table 1.  As reported in the table, the total market value of this subset of 
the population of publicly traded Internet companies was over $400 billion at December 
31, 1999 and February 28, 2000, but was slightly less than $300 billion as of May 31, 
2000.   
 
Further descriptive statistics for the sample are provided in Table 2.  As reflected in that 
table, the market capitalization of the mean (median) Internet company quarter in our 
sample is $5,559 ($619) million and $3,823 ($246) as at December 31, 1999 and May 31, 
2000, respectively.  As evidenced by both the market value listings in Table 1 and the 
descriptive statistics provided in Table 2, the distribution of the market values of the 
companies included in the sample is significantly skewed.   Table 2 also reports the 
descriptive statistics for the sample excluding AOL and Yahoo!.  The mean (median) 
market values for the balance of the sample are $2,067 ($599) million and $1,513 ($219) 
million, at December 31, 1999 and May 31, 2000, respectively.   
 
 
                                                 
13 According to Nielsen/Netratings, a web property meets the cutoff in any given month if a sufficient 
number of Nielsen/Netratings’ approximately 50,000 panel members visit the site such that extrapolation to 
the population of web surfers as a whole can be reliably performed. 
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5. The Correlation Between Monthly Stock Returns and Web Traffic Metrics 
 
Prior to undertaking a full valuation analysis involving quarterly financial and non-
financial data, we examine in this section the association between monthly stock returns 
and a broad set of web metrics.  In particular, we examine the speed and direction of 
investors’ reaction to web traffic performance data.  This is an important issue, given the 
extensive use of traffic measures by investors and financial analysts. 
 
5.1 Contemporaneous Correlations 
 
The Nielsen/Netratings database upon which we rely releases web traffic measures on a 
weekly basis during any given month, and then reports the consolidated monthly totals 
several weeks subsequent to the end of the month.  It is therefore plausible that the 
market may impound the information contained in monthly levels and/or changes in web 
metrics within the month of their occurrence (i.e., contemporaneously).   
 
Table 3A reports the Spearman rank correlations between monthly stock returns and the 
contemporaneous levels of web metrics for 1999 and 2000, respectively.14  As reflected 
in the table, Internet companies’ monthly stock returns are positively correlated with 
contemporaneous measures of reach, unique audience, total pageviews, and visits per 
person in 1999.  The significance of these correlations provides preliminary evidence 
that, consistent with analysts’ reports, anecdotal discussions in the business press, and 
prior research (TWZ, RKV, and Hand (2000b)), web companies that had attained a 
“critical mass” of customers and/or web traffic in 1999 were those that investors expected 
to profit most in the networked economy.  As reflected in the second panel of Table 3A, 
the reach, unique audience, and total page view web metrics remained positively 
correlated with monthly stock returns in the first 5 months of the year 2000, but less 
significantly so than in 1999. 
 
                                                 
14 The 1999 correlations include the months of February (the inception of the database) through to 
December.  The year 2000 correlations include the months of January through May for this current draft of 
the paper. 
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In order to provide some descriptive evidence regarding the speed with which changes in 
web metrics appear to be impounded into stock price, we examine the pairwise 
correlations between monthly stock returns and changes in various measures of web 
traffic activity.  The Spearman rank correlations provided in Table 3B suggest that the 
contemporaneous changes in total page views and in visits per person are both 
significantly correlated with the monthly percentage changes in Internet stock prices in 
each of 1999 and 2000.  In 2000, the change in the average time spent per person per visit 
is also positively correlated with contemporaneous stock returns.  Overall, it appears as 
though investors react rather promptly to web traffic data. 
 
5.2 One-month Lag Correlations 
 
Although the Nielsen/Netratings service releases web traffic measures on a weekly basis 
during any given month, other web rating agencies upon which market participants may 
rely may not produce such frequent and timely information. Either because of delayed 
reporting or delayed market reaction, the stock market may not impound the web traffic 
information in a manner that is consistent with strong form market efficiency.15   
 
Accordingly, we investigate the correlations between Internet companies’ monthly stock 
returns and the one-month lag in levels and percentage changes in web traffic metrics.  
As shown in the top panel of Table 3C, the correlations between the current returns and 
the one-month lag in levels of reach, unique audience, total page views, and visits per 
person are all significant in 1999.  From the bottom panel of Table 3C, it is evident that 
none of the web metric levels are significantly correlated with monthly stock returns in 
2000.  The results are consistent with market participants having increased the speed with 
which they impound web traffic levels into price in the year 2000 relative to 1999.  This, 
                                                 
15 When interpreting the behavior of Internet stocks, it is important to recognize that a significant 
percentage of the public floats of these companies are held by individual investors (including “day 
traders”).  Subscriptions to commercial web metric databases cost approximately $50,000 per year, so it 
seems reasonable to assume that individual investors are unlikely to have access to the web metric data in a 
timely fashion.  Nevertheless, the web metric data does become disseminated through various other 
channels (e.g., MediaMetrix provides a free listing of the “Top 50” properties visited on their homepage, 
articles and corporate news releases carried in the popular press will often report the most recent web traffic 
statistics for the company being reported on, and web investing “chat rooms” are replete with information 
related to web companies’ traffic performance). 
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in turn, could be interpreted as an increase in market efficiency with respect to the web 
traffic metrics.   
 
Table 3D presents the correlations between monthly stock returns and one-month lag 
changes in web metrics.  The results reflect that none of the lagged changes in web 
metrics are significantly correlated with monthly stock returns in either 1999 or 2000. 
 
In summary, we find that both contemporaneous levels and changes in various web traffic 
metrics are significantly correlated with monthly stock returns in each of 1999 and 2000, 
but the significance levels decrease in the later time period.  More strikingly, the one-
month lag in web traffic levels is significantly correlated with monthly stock returns in 
1999, but the significance disappears in 2000.  Thus, while investors generally appear to 
react promptly to the release of traffic measures, the results suggest that there may have 
been some delayed reaction by the market in the earlier stages of the internet economy.  
 
 
6. The Valuation Role of Financial and Non-Financial Information 
 
6.1 The Results of Factor Analysis on The Web Traffic Measures 
 
Table 4 presents the results of a common factor analysis on the quarterly web traffic 
metrics derived from the Nielsen/Netratings database for the firms included in our 
sample.16,17 Panel A shows the standardized regression coefficients associated with each 
factor, while Panel B presents the rotated factor pattern matrix resulting from the factor 
analysis.18  We have labeled each of the estimated factors according to the underlying 
web traffic performance construct that we interpret the factor to represent.  As shown in 
the table, the first factor is labeled “REACH” because it loads heavily on the unique 
audience, total page views, and active reach raw web metrics.  The second factor loads 
                                                 
16 The Nielsen/Netratings database provides monthly web traffic metrics.  We compile quarterly metrics by 
averaging the three monthly metrics for the months included in each company’s corresponding fiscal 
quarter. 
17 Our factor analysis results are obtained by setting the prior communality estimates to the squared 
multiple correlations of each included web metric variable with all other included web metric variables.  
18 The rotated factor pattern matrix is presented because it is more intuitively interpretable.  The estimates 
are based upon the use of the varimax orthogonal factor rotation method. 
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most heavily on the original web metrics for the time spent per person per visit to the site 
and the average number of pages viewed per person per visit, and therefore corresponds 
to the underlying web traffic performance construct of  “stickiness”.  The third factor 
loads on the web metric for the average number of visits to the site per person per quarter, 
and accordingly appears to capture the notion of “customer loyalty”.   
 
Using the scores for each of the preceding factors, we construct variables labeled 
“REACH”, “STICKINESS”, and “LOYALTY”, which we use as explanatory variables 
for Internet company price-to-sales ratios in our subsequent regression analyses.19 
 
6.2 Valuation Results  
 
In Tables 5 and 6 we report the estimates from regressions of Internet companies’ price-
to-sales (“P/S”) ratios on a number of financial statement variables and our parsimonious 
set of web traffic performance measures for the years 1999 and 2000, respectively.20,21 
Financial statement data for the second quarter of the year 2000 are not currently 
available at the time of this writing.  In order to produce two quarters of data for the year 
2000, and to reflect the delayed release of financial statement data to the market, we 
compute the following price to sales ratios:  the market value of the firm’s common 
equity as at February 28, 2000 divided by the firm’s total revenues for the quarter ended 
December 31, 1999; and the market values at May 31, 2000 divided by total revenues 
reported for the quarter ended March 31, 2000.  We refer to these two sets of 
observations as quarter one and quarter two of the year 2000, respectively. 
 
In a slight deviation from prior research in the Internet industry, we choose the price-to-
sales ratio rather than market-to-book as our dependent variable in the valuation 
                                                 
19 The “visits per person” raw web metric was not available in the Neilson/Netratings database prior to 
August 1999.  Accordingly, we estimate the factors for all quarters for which the full data is available, and 
then “back-fill” the first few quarters of 1999 using the firm-specific fitted factors from the first available 
quarter. 
20 Unless otherwise noted, all of the financial statement explanatory variables included in the regressions 
reported in this study are scaled by total revenues. 
21 All of the regression results reported in the paper are for the full sample of available firms for each 
period, excluding observations that were considered to have undue influence on the determination of the 
coefficients.  Observations were excluded if the absolute value of the standardized residual was greater than 
three and/or if the value of the Cook’s distance was greater than one. 
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regressions.  We make this research design choice for several reasons.  First, price-to-
sales is the financial metric that is most commonly referred to by analysts and the 
business press in their evaluations and discussions of Internet companies.  In this sector, 
price-to-sales takes on the role that the price-to-earnings ratio has traditionally held in the 
valuation of going concern entities because most Internet companies are not yet profitable 
(and therefore P/E cannot be sensibly applied).  A similar argument applies to the book 
value of equity in this sector.  Book values are depressed because Internet companies 
have few tangible assets and their massive expenditures on the all-important intangible 
assets are generally expensed rather than capitalized.  The market-to-book ratio therefore 
does not have the same economic interpretation and intuitive appeal as it does in the 
cross-section of more established and profitable firms.   Furthermore, from a statistical 
perspective, the market-to-book ratios tend to “blow up” because of this small 
denominator problem. 
 
6.2.1 The Relevance of Web Traffic Factors 
 
As shown in Table 5, the REACH and STICKINESS web performance factors are 
significantly positively associated with the P/S ratios in both 1999 and 2000, although 
LOYALTY is not significant in either year.22  The finding of significance for our 
REACH factor is consistent with the results of prior studies that have examined the 
value-relevance of raw web metrics such as reach or unique visitors (TWZ, RVK, and 
Hand (2000b), but is inconsistent with Hand’s (2000b) finding that total page views is not 
a significant valuation variable.  Our finding of significance for the STICKINESS factor 
is unique to this study, and is inconsistent with Hand’s (2000b) finding of insignificance 
for a raw measure of the time spent at a company’s websites.  For several reasons, a 
direct comparison between our results and those of Hand (2000b) is not possible.  First, 
Hand (2000b) utilizes a log-linear valuation model, while we use a more conventional 
linear OLS specification.  Second, we examine the value-relevance of an orthogonal set 
of fitted web factors, while Hand (2000b) includes the original raw web metrics as 
                                                 
22 LOYALTY becomes relevant in a more extended version of the valuation model discussed in Section 6.4 
below. 
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dependent variables.23  Finally, our sample is comprised of firms from only those B2C 
subsectors for which we expect web metrics to be relevant, while Hand (2000b) explores 
other economic issues and therefore includes virtually the entire population of publicly-
traded Internet stocks in his study.    
 
Our finding of statistically significant coefficients on REACH and STICKINESS in the 
year 2000 regressions is consistent with our hypotheses, but contrary to the recent 
suggestions of Wall Street analysts that web traffic metrics are no longer relevant for the 
valuation of Internet stocks.  Thus, even as the Internet sector begins to mature and B2C 
companies develop longer operating histories (with the commensurate time series of 
financial valuation variables becoming available), the web traffic metrics that were 
relevant during the “bubble” period of the market continue to be significant determinants 
of Internet companies’ price-to-sales ratios after the Internet shakeout. 
 
6.2.2 The Value-Relevance of Traditional Financial Statement Information 
 
With the exception of cost of goods/services sold (CGS), each of the income statement 
components is significantly value-relevant in 1999, as shown in the first column of Table 
5. The positive coefficients on advertising and marketing expenses (MKTGEXP), and on 
R&D and product development (PRODEVLP) in 1999, are consistent with our 
predictions and with the results of prior studies related to the valuation of expenditures on 
intangible assets (e.g., Amir and Lev (1996) and Lev and Sougiannis (1996)).  The 
findings suggest that the market viewed B2C Internet companies’ material expenditures 
directed towards customer acquisitions and product development as investments rather 
than current expenses in 1999.    
 
The second column of Table 5 shows that, for 2000, cost of goods/services sold (CGS) is 
negatively and significantly associated with the P/S ratios, as expected, but marketing and 
product development expenses are no longer significant determinants of Internet 
companies’ P/S ratios.  These findings suggest that in the year 2000, the market is no 
                                                 
23For our 1999 and 2000 data, the raw web metrics exhibit significant pairwise correlation (see Table 3A).  
Accordingly, the direct inclusion of any subset of these raw web metrics as explanatory regression 
variables would likely result in a significant multicollinearity problem in our valuation estimations.   
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longer willing to implicitly capitalize expenditures on intangible assets in valuing Internet 
stocks.  Notably, the coefficients remain positive, which suggests that the market is not, 
on average, treating the marketing and development expenses as reductions to firm value.  
One possible interpretation of these results is that the market is continuing to capitalize 
marketing and development expenses for those companies for which it expects the 
expenditures to lead to realizable future benefits, while treating the expenses as 
reductions in value for those companies for which the future realization of benefits is 
more uncertain.  Since our regression model estimates a mean coefficient for all of the 
companies in the year 2000 sample, the resultant coefficient would therefore not be 
significantly different from zero for the sample as a whole.  An alternative interpretation 
is that the market continued to capitalize these expenditures during the first quarter of 
2000, but then stopped capitalizing them and/or began treating them as expenses in the 
second quarter of 2000.  In Section 7, we provide evidence that favors the latter 
interpretation of results. 
 
 
6.3 The Importance of “Cash Burn” 
 
Table 5 reports the results of our investigation into the valuation role of Internet 
companies’ abilities to sustain their current rate of cash burn.  The cash burn proxy, 
BURNLEFT, is defined as cash on hand divided by the current period’s cash flows from 
operations.  For many companies in the sample, cash flows from operations are negative, 
and therefore the BURNLEFT proxy provides a measure of the number of quarters left in 
the life of the company if it continues to “burn cash” at its current rate and does not 
obtain additional capital.  Because the valuation implications of the cash burn proxy are 
likely to be different for firms with negative versus positive cash flows from operations, 
we also include the variable BURNnegv. BURNnegv is equal to BURNLEFT for firms 
with negative cash flows from operations and is set equal to zero for firms with positive 
operating cash flows.  The coefficient estimate on BURNnegv is therefore interpretable 
as the incremental slope on the burn proxy for firms with negative operating cash flows. 
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The results in Table 5 show that for both 1999 and 2000, the ratio of cash on hand to cash 
flows generated from/used in operations during the quarter (BURNLEFT) is significantly 
associated with the price-to-sales ratios of Internet companies.  For companies with 
negative cash flows from operations, the value of BURNLEFT is negative, and therefore 
the significant positive coefficient on BURNLEFT results in a reduction to overall firm 
value.  In the year 2000, BURNnegv is also significant, carrying a negative coefficient 
that partially offsets the coefficient on BURNLEFT.24  For companies with positive cash 
flows from operations, the positive coefficient on BURNLEFT results in a positive 
addition to value.  The intuition for this may be that the free cash flows (i.e., significant 
cash stores and lack of cash burn) provide these Internet companies with greater option 
value - the availability of cash provides these companies with the flexibility to adapt to 
rapidly changing market conditions and to react to emerging opportunities. 
  
 
6.4 The Value-Relevance of Strategic Alliances 
 
Table 6 reports the results of valuation regressions that include three variables 
representing the nature and extent of alliances with strategic partners.  “AOLdummy” is 
an indicator variable that is set equal to one if the firm has announced a strategic alliance 
with AOL, and is zero otherwise.  “TOP10dummy” is an indicator variable that is set 
equal to one if the firm has announced a strategic alliance with one or more of the other 
“top 10” internet traffic-generating companies, which include: Lycos, Amazon, Yahoo!, 
MSN/Microsoft, Excite@Home, Alta Vista, GO Network, Go2Net, Time Warner (prior 
to the merger with AOL), and C/NET.  “TotalAlliances” is a count variable that captures 
the cumulative number of strategic alliances that the company has announced itself to 
have entered into.   
 
With the exception of the coefficient on LOYALTY, which becomes significant and 
positively associated with B2C companies’ price-to-sales ratios for both 1999 and 2000 
                                                 
24 Given the relatively high degree of multicollinearity between these variables, we refrain from making 
any strong inferences related to the magnitudes of their coefficients. 
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when the alliance variables are added to the regression, all of the previous findings 
remain intact.   
 
As shown in the first column of Table 6, an alliance with AOL is positively associated 
with the price-to-sales ratios of B2C stocks in 1999.  This finding with respect to 
alliances with AOL in 1999 complements those of Rajgopal, et al (2000), who document 
a weak positive association between alliances with AOL and a web traffic measure for 
reach during 1999.  We establish a more direct link between AOL alliances and the 
market value of B2C stocks for the same time period.  In 2000, we find that AOL 
alliances are no longer value relevant for Internet stocks, as shown in the second column 
of Table 6.  We also find that the cumulative sum of alliances entered into 
(TotalAlliances) is significantly negatively associated with the price-to-sales ratios of 
Internet stocks in both 1999 and 2000.  These findings lend support to arguments in the 
popular press that strategic alliances have not provided their anticipated benefits (e.g., 
The Industry Standard, May 1, 2000).    
 
 
7. Predicting the Shakeout 
 
In Table 7A we present the results of the full valuation model applied to the first quarter 
of the year 2000.  The significance levels for some of the coefficients have clearly 
dropped relative to their counterparts in Table 6 due to the smaller number of 
observations used in the Table 7A estimation.  With one notable exception, however, the 
signs and magnitudes of the coefficients generally remain unchanged.  The exception is 
R&D and product development (PRODEVLP), which carries a positive and significant 
coefficient.  This result is consistent with the previous finding for the year 1999, but 
inconsistent with the lack of significance found for PRODEVLP for the combined 2000 
results shown in the second column of Table 6.  Thus, the second quarter of 2000 was 
responsible for driving away the positive and significant coefficient on PRODEVLP in 
the previously reported combined 2000 results.  In other words, the market appears to 
have capitalized B2C companies’ expenditures on R&D and product development until 
the bursting of the bubble in the spring of 2000. 
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Table 7B reports the correlations between the residuals from the Table 7A regression and 
the percentage change in the price-to-sales ratios from quarter 1 to quarter 2 of 2000 – 
i.e., the change in P/S from before to after the bursting of the bubble.  As shown, the 
residuals from the first quarter valuation regression are significantly negatively correlated 
with subsequent changes in the P/S ratios.  In other words, B2C companies that were 
relatively “over-valued” before the bursting of the bubble (i.e., those with more positive 
regression residuals) experienced more negative changes in their P/S ratios in the second 
quarter of 2000.   
 
In Table 8 we present the results of regressing the percentage change in the P/S ratio from 
quarter 1 to quarter 2 of 2000 against the residual from the regression reported in 7A, 
together with a number of variables that prior studies in the industrial economics 
literature have found to be associated with companies that fail during the rationalization 
of a nascent industry.  Consistent with the pairwise correlation results in Table 7B, our 
measure of the extent of relative over-valuation (RESIDQ1) is significantly negatively 
associated with the percentage change in the price-to-sales ratio in the second quarter of 
2000, even when other competing explanatory variables are included in the regression.  
Consistent the findings of prior studies in the economics literature (e.g., Klepper and 
Simons (2000)), company age is a significant determinant of shakeout.  The positive 
coefficient on AGE (measured as the number of days since IPO) suggests that firms that 
went public later in the Internet boom experienced more negative changes in their price-
to-sales ratios when the bubble burst.  Contrary to the results of prior studies, company 
size (logMV) is not a significant determinant of shakeout.25 
 
The coefficient on ETAIL, an indicator variable that is set equal to one for firms that are 
in the e-tail sector (and zero otherwise), is negative but not quite significantly associated 
with the change in price-to-sales ratio.  This result is consistent with the fact that e-tail 
companies led the B2C shakeout, and had already shed a considerable percentage of their 
market values prior to the end of the first quarter of 2000 and therefore fell somewhat less 
dramatically in the second quarter of 2000 than stocks in other B2C sectors. 
                                                 
25 The results are robust to other measures of firm size, including log(total revenues) and log(total assets). 
 25
8. Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work 
 
In this study we have explored the major value-drivers of Internet companies’ share 
prices.  Our study extends the pioneering work on Internet stock valuation along several 
dimensions: (1) we examine the role of financial and non-financial drivers both before 
and after the “bursting of the Internet bubble” in March-April 2000; (2) we apply a 
systematic selection process (factor analysis) to the multiple web traffic measures that are 
available from commercial databases in order to arrive at a parsimonious set of 
orthogonal web performance measures; (3) we investigate the valuation role of our proxy 
for B2C companies’ ability to sustain their current rate of “cash burn”; and (4) we 
investigate the determinants of fallout during the market correction of the spring of 2000. 
 
Our primary conclusions from this study are as follows.  First, we find evidence that 
contradicts the claims by some analysts that web traffic metrics are no longer important.   
All three of our three web traffic performance factors remain value-relevant in 2000.  
Second, consistent with the findings of prior studies in other intangible asset based 
industries, we find that despite the expensing in financial reports of all periodic 
expenditures on knowledge, customer acquisitions, and technology, investors make a 
distinction between expenses and investments.  In particular, product development 
(R&D) and advertising expenses (customer acquisition costs) appear to be capitalized as 
assets by investors in their assessment of Internet company value during the “bubble” 
period when investors were more optimistic about the prospects of B2C companies.  
However, neither marketing nor product development costs are implicitly capitalized into 
value, on average, subsequent to the industry shakeout in the spring of 2000.  We also 
find that our proxy for companies’ ability to sustain their current rate of “cash burn” is an 
important value-driver in each of 1999 and 2000.  Finally, we find that our measure of the 
relative over-valuation of B2C stocks in the first quarter of 2000 is positively associated 
with the drop in price-to-sales ratios during the shakeout.  This finding is robust to the 
inclusion of competing explanatory variables suggested by the economics literature 
related to industry rationalizations. 
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We thus provide a preliminary view of the shakeout and maturation of the B2C Internet 
sector.  Overall, our study suggests that in the post-bubble 2000 period investors adopted 
a more skeptical attitude with regards to intangible investments (product development 
and customer acquisition costs); absent meaningful financial results, investors continue to 
rely heavily on web traffic measures; and, perhaps most importantly, the excesses of the 
early 1998-1999 valuations have been systematically eliminated. 
 
In ongoing work in this sector, we examine several additional Internet stock valuation 
issues, including the role of web metric momentum in explaining stock returns and the 
determinants of Internet stock price volatility.  The latter issue is of considerable concern 
to both policymakers and investors.  
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TABLE 1 
List of Internet Companies Included in the Study 
Market Values (in millions) 
      Market Value  Market Value  Market Value 
Company Name Ticker Symbol Sector as at 12/31/99 as at 2/28/00 as at 5/31/00 
1-800-FLOWERS.COM FLWS e-tail $248.05 $204.55 $143.06
About.com BOUT content/community 1,377.48 1,143.43 696.27
Alloy Online ALOY e-tail 227.90 249.61 174.56
Amazon.com AMZN e-tail 25,942.40 22,406.73 16,886.04
America Online (AOL) AOL portal 169,617.44 138,189.50 121,789.31
Ameritrade Holding AMTD financial news/svcs 3,428.01 2,815.70 1,986.27
Ask Jeeves ASKJ services 3,027.29 2,014.46 709.96
Audible ADBL e-tail 384.46 323.59 143.97
Audiohighway AHWY e-tail 48.75 39.86 11.42
barnesandnoble.com BNBN e-tail 414.49 233.72 281.89
Beyond.com BYND e-tail 283.20 190.31 60.63
BigStar Entertainment BGST e-tail 66.20 45.91 15.87
Bluefly BFLY e-tail 50.74 52.89 15.39
Broadcast.com BCST content/community * * * 
C/NET CNET content/community 4,169.76 4,922.89 2,916.03
CareerBuilder CBDR content/community 152.46 145.06 54.93
CDnow CDNW e-tail 299.76 242.84 96.34
Cheap Tickets CTIX e-tail 328.55 372.95 303.48
Concentric Network CNCX services 1,276.65 2,144.16 2,316.13
Crosswalk.com AMEN e-tail 38.65 43.36 19.08
Cyberian Outpost COOL e-tail 234.00 203.83 122.80
DLJdirect DIR financial news/svcs 249.55 175.95 156.40
drkoop.com KOOP content/community 359.86 268.95 37.98
drugstore.com DSCM e-tail 1,569.34 823.97 313.03
Earthweb EWBX content/community 491.20 264.21 103.64
E*TRADE Group EGRP financial news/svcs 6,500.68 6,613.04 4,539.77
eBay EBAY e-tail 16,191.50 18,762.09 16,289.14
EDGAR Online EDGR financial news/svcs 91.80 141.58 52.95
eFax EFAX services 93.13 82.24 14.01
Egghead.com EGGS e-tail 600.59 352.47 135.99
E-Loan.com EELN financial news/svcs 677.90 370.24 204.02
eToys ETYS e-tail 3,143.59 1,801.13 587.82
Exodus Communications  EXDS services 15,138.27 22,797.95 14,548.57
fashionmall.com FASH e-tail 33.28 28.59 17.81
FatBrain.com FATB e-tail 286.09 181.21 85.04
Go2Net GNET content/community 2,419.90 3,284.10 1,427.29
GoTo.com GOTO services 2,675.00 2,908.35 717.41
HeadHunter.NET HHNT content/community 135.40 168.41 92.76
Healtheon(WebMD) HLTH services 2,705.66 4,040.46 2,753.46
Homestore.com HOMS content/community 5,202.18 5,328.59 1,814.17
Hoover's Inc. HOOV financial news/svcs 106.22 139.80 82.96
HotJobs.com HOTJ content/community 1,347.67 771.20 368.39
Infonautics INFO content/community 82.49 115.63 52.77
Infoseek SEEK portal * * * 
InfoSpace.com INSP portal 10,314.15 21,025.94 9,954.43
InsWeb INSW e-tail 886.23 546.04 82.34
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TABLE 1 (cont'd) 
List of Internet Companies Included in the Study 
Market Values (in millions)  
      
      Market Value  Market Value Market Value 
Company Name Ticker Symbol Sector as at 12/31/99 as at 2/28/00 as at 5/31/00
internet.com INTM content/community 1,218.73 1,122.11 388.08
iTurf TURF content/community 104.70 92.07 29.56
iVillage IVIL content/community 598.06 564.84 233.38
JFAX.com JFAX services 220.74 166.33 54.15
Launch Media LAUN content/community 242.12 233.33 117.25
LookSmart LOOK content/community 2,309.85 4,111.75 1,219.60
Lycos LCOS portal 7,668.79 6,351.11 6,649.61
Mail.com MAIL services 653.57 615.99 258.86
MapQuest.com MQST services 757.49 627.40 594.75
MarketWatch.com MKTW financial news/svcs 505.63 596.54 296.29
MP3.com MPPP content/community 2,171.51 1,237.80 756.19
Mpath Interactive MPTH content/community 636.84 445.49 164.66
Multex.com MLTX financial news/svcs 1,008.61 717.09 393.23
musicmaker.com HITS e-tail 193.84 142.29 66.28
MyPoints.com MYPT services 1,866.95 1,351.27 294.30
NetBank NTBK financial news/svcs 543.79 451.93 303.83
Network Solutions NSOL services 7,270.72 10,615.79 10,700.14
NextCard NXCD financial news/svcs 1,464.02 1,188.33 491.18
ONSALE ONSL e-tail * * * 
Peapod PPOD e-tail 156.60 154.33 37.02
Preview Travel PTVL e-tail 726.57 617.67 * 
priceline.com PCLN e-tail 6,936.98 7,888.75 6,485.67
Quokka Sports QKKA content/community 577.50 580.25 202.71
Salon.com SALN content/community 56.82 77.86 27.73
SportsLine USA SPLN content/community 1,180.64 1,012.82 301.60
Stamps.com STMP services 1,672.99 1,220.83 485.01
StarMedia Network STRM portal 2,337.65 2,749.74 1,167.91
Student Advantage STAD content/community 781.31 523.81 118.45
Talk City TCTY content/community 637.01 268.21 42.17
theglobe.com TGLO content/community 222.93 211.29 48.55
TheStreet.com TSCM financial news/svcs 470.52 285.07 151.82
Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch TMCS e-tail 536.05 913.35 651.27
uBid UBID e-tail 305.36 337.77 * 
US SEARCH Corp.com SRCH services 130.66 7.00 27.47
Value America VUSA e-tail 226.57 179.02 65.87
Xoom.com XMCM services * * * 
Yahoo! YHOO portal 113,900.63 85,256.81 61,422.75
ZD Net ZDZ content/community 1,501.50 2,252.25 764.16
        
Total Market Capitalization     $444,712 $402,146 $298,187
* Broadcast.com and OnSale were purchased by Yahoo and Egghead.com, respectively,  prior to December 31, 1999.  
Xoom merged with NBCi in November 1999.  NetGravity  merged with DoubleClick in November 1999. Preview Travel 
merged with Travelocity in March 2000.   Infoseek became part of the Walt Disney Internet Group in November 1999.  
Ubid was acquired by CMGI in April 2000.  These companies are included in the sample for periods ending prior to their 
acquisitions. 
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TABLE 2A 
Descriptive Statistics for the Internet Companies Included in the Sample 
        
        
        
        
        
     Market Value Market Value   
     excluding  excluding   
   Market Value Market Value AOL & Yahoo! AOL & Yahoo!  
   at 12/31/99 at 5/31/00 at 12/31/1999 at 5/31/2000  
   ($ millions)  ($ millions)   ($ millions)   ($ millions)  
        
Mean  $5,559 $3,823 $2,067 $1,513  
Std. Deviation  22,750 15,537 4,079 3,555  
1st Quartile  232 70 229 66  
Median  619 246 599 219  
3rd Quartile  2,206  747  1,818  712  
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TABLE 2B 
1999:  Pearson Correlations Between Regression Variables (N=118) 
               
   PRSALES CGS MKTGEXP PRODEVLP REACH STICKINESS LOYALTY BURNLEFT BURNnegv Top10dummy AOLdummy TotalAllnc 
PRSALES 1.000 -0.062 0.264 0.189 0.234 0.346 0.106 0.201 0.071 -0.050 0.266 0.064 
CGS  1.000 0.430 -0.046 -0.194 -0.184 -0.210 -0.068 0.118 -0.182 -0.158 -0.166 
MKTGEXP   1.000 0.229 -0.145 -0.090 -0.091 0.017 -0.026 -0.192 -0.029 -0.205 
PRODEVLP   1.000 -0.119 -0.059 0.128 0.038 0.083 -0.005 0.044 -0.135 
REACH   1.000 -0.058 0.238 0.046 0.079 0.384 0.306 0.809 
STICKINESS   1.000 0.128 -0.053 0.021 0.135 0.208 0.092 
LOYALTY   1.000 0.117 0.087 0.156 0.049 0.477 
BURNLEFT    1.000 0.311 -0.044 -0.019 -0.001 
BURNnegv    1.000 0.061 -0.022 0.071 
Top10dummy    1.000 0.076 0.477 
AOLdummy    1.000 0.421 
TotalAllnc                        1.000 
             
             
TABLE 2B 
2000:  Pearson Correlations Between Regression Variables (N=118) 
               
   PRSALES CGS MKTGEXP PRODEVLP REACH STICKINESS LOYALTY BURNLEFT BURNnegv Top10dummy AOLdummy TotalAllnc 
PRSALES 1.000 -0.296 -0.013 0.160 0.424 0.324 0.217 0.189 0.072 0.170 0.158 0.307 
CGS  1.000 0.201 -0.122 -0.139 -0.140 -0.258 0.100 0.150 -0.193 -0.098 -0.136 
MKTGEXP   1.000 0.508 -0.155 -0.108 -0.029 -0.052 0.014 -0.053 0.059 -0.171 
PRODEVLP   1.000 -0.061 -0.038 0.177 0.051 0.098 0.083 -0.017 -0.067 
REACH   1.000 0.061 0.046 0.174 0.119 0.302 0.170 0.783 
STICKINESS   1.000 0.043 0.131 0.064 -0.026 0.291 0.202 
LOYALTY   1.000 0.061 -0.025 0.164 0.243 0.296 
BURNLEFT    1.000 0.898 0.075 0.155 0.170 
BURNnegv    1.000 -0.012 0.054 0.092 
Top10dummy    1.000 -0.004 0.303 
AOLdummy    1.000 0.359 
TotalAllnc                        1.000 
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TABLE 3 
 
Panel A1999: Spearman Rank Correlations Between 1999 Monthly Stock Returns and Contemporaneous Web Metric Levels* 
         
  RETRNMTH REACH UNIQAUD PAGEVIEW PAGEPP VISITPP TIMEPP 
RETRNMTH 1.000 0.129 0.131 0.142 0.077 0.144 -0.027
REACH  1.000 0.998 0.860 0.259 0.447 0.283
UNIQAUD   1.000 0.870 0.275 0.446 0.280
PAGEVIEW    1.000 0.683 0.627 0.599
PAGEPP     1.000 0.625 0.811
VISITPP      1.000 0.716
TIMEPP       1.000
TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
Panel A2000: Spearman Rank Correlations Between 2000 Monthly Stock Returns and Contemporaneous Web Metric Levels* 
         
  RETRNMTH REACH UNIQAUD PAGEVIEW PAGEPP VISITPP TIMEPP 
RETRNMTH 1.000 0.118 0.111 0.120 0.077 0.088 0.087
REACH  1.000 0.999 0.909 0.433 0.480 0.407
UNIQAUD   1.000 0.909 0.432 0.481 0.406
PAGEVIEW    1.000 0.749 0.656 0.694
PAGEPP     1.000 0.681 0.909
VISITPP      1.000 0.702
TIMEPP       1.000
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TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B1999: Spearman Rank Correlations Between 1999 Monthly Stock Returns and Contemporaneous Changes in Web Metrics* 
        
  RETRNMTH CHGREACH CHGAUD CHGVIEWS CHGPAGPP CHGVISIT CHGTIMEPP
RETRNMTH 1.000 0.034 0.059 0.081 0.068 -0.113 -0.013
CHGREACH  1.000 0.963 0.596 0.151 0.006 0.050
CHGAUD   1.000 0.606 0.149 -0.030 0.070
CHGVIEWS    1.000 0.806 0.351 0.474
CHGPAGPP     1.000 0.504 0.599
CHGVISIT      1.000 0.509
CHGTIMEPP       1.000
TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B2000: Spearman Rank Correlations Between 2000 Monthly Stock Returns and Contemporaneous Changes in Web Metrics* 
        
  RETRNMTH CHGREACH CHGAUD CHGVIEWS CHGPAGPP CHGVISIT CHGTIMEPP
RETRNMTH 1.000 0.065 0.092 0.107 0.098 0.162 0.143
CHGREACH  1.000 0.984 0.613 -0.029 -0.035 0.094
CHGAUD   1.000 0.626 -0.025 -0.010 0.107
CHGVIEWS    1.000 0.681 0.482 0.651
CHGPAGPP     1.000 0.638 0.814
CHGVISIT      1.000 0.578
CHGTIMEPP       1.000
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TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
Panel C1999: Spearman Rank Correlations Between 1999 Monthly Stock Returns and One-Month Lags in Web Metric Levels* 
        
  RETRNMTH LAGREACH LAGUNIQ LAGPGVIU LAGPGPP LAGVISTPP LAGTIMEPP
RETRNMTH 1.000 0.121 0.121 0.116 0.049 0.167 -0.024
LAGREACH  1.000 0.998 0.849 0.235 0.438 0.260
LAGUNIQ   1.000 0.859 0.249 0.437 0.256
LAGPGVIU    1.000 0.678 0.624 0.593
LAGPGPP     1.000 0.621 0.812
LAGVISTPP      1.000 0.728
LAGTIMEPP       1.000
TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
Panel C2000: Spearman Rank Correlations Between 2000 Monthly Stock Returns and One-Month Lags in Web Metric Levels* 
        
  RETRNMTH LAGREACH LAGUNIQ LAGPGVIU LAGPGPP LAGVISTPP LAGTIMEPP
RETRNMTH 1.000 0.079 0.069 0.089 0.059 0.068 0.048
LAGREACH  1.000 0.999 0.908 0.411 0.475 0.388
LAGUNIQ   1.000 0.907 0.409 0.474 0.386
LAGPGVIU    1.000 0.730 0.651 0.678
LAGPGPP     1.000 0.673 0.906
LAGVISTPP      1.000 0.698
LAGTIMEPP       1.000
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TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
Panel D1999: Spearman Rank Correlations Between 1999 Monthly Stock Returns and One-Month Lag Changes in Web Metrics* 
        
  RETRNMTH LAGCHGRCH LAGCHGAUD LAGCHGVIU LAGCHGPGP LAGCHGVPP
LAGCHGTP
P 
RETRNMTH 1.000 0.009 0.015 0.044 0.074 0.017 0.039
LAGCHGRCH 1.000 0.957 0.590 0.151 -0.060 0.060
LAGCHGAUD 1.000 0.599 0.144 -0.099 0.092
LAGCHGVIU 1.000 0.812 0.362 0.489
LAGCHGPGP 1.000 0.554 0.604
LAGCHGVPP 1.000 0.465
LAGCHGTPP 1.000
TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
Panel D2000: Spearman Rank Correlations Between 2000 Monthly Stock Returns and One-Month Lag Changes in Web Metrics* 
        
  RETRNMTH LAGCHGRCH LAGCHGAUD LAGCHGVIU LAGCHGPGP LAGCHGVPP
LAGCHGTP
P 
RETRNMTH 1.000 0.085 0.047 0.018 -0.015 0.004 0.093
LAGCHGRCH 1.000 0.988 0.617 0.036 0.028 0.056
LAGCHGAUD 1.000 0.622 0.035 0.033 0.047
LAGCHGVIU 1.000 0.729 0.492 0.585
LAGCHGPGP 1.000 0.633 0.781
LAGCHGVPP 1.000 0.592
LAGCHGTPP 1.000
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
 
 
Variable Name Definition 
RETRNMTH Monthly change in the market value of the company’s common stock 
REACH The percentage of active web surfers who viewed the site during the month 
UNIQAUD Unique Audience - the number of unique web surfers who viewed the site during the month 
PAGEVIEW Page Views - the total number of pages viewed at the site during the month 
PAGEPP Pages per Person - the average number of pages viewed per person per visit during the month 
VISITPP Visits per Person - the average number of visits to the site per unique visitor during the month 
TIMEPP Time per Person - the average time spent at the site per person per visit 
CHGREACH Change in Reach (i.e., the percentage change in reach relative to the prior month) 
CHGAUD Change in Unique Audience 
CHGVIEWS Change in Page Views 
CHGPAGPP Change in Pages per Person 
CHGVISIT Change in Visits per Person 
CHGTIMEPP Change in Time per Person 
LAGREACH Prior month’s Reach (i.e., one-month lag in Reach) 
LAGUNIQ Prior month’s Unique Audience 
LAGPGVIU Prior month’s Page Views 
LAGPGPP Prior month’s Pages per Person 
LAGVISTPP Prior month’s Visits per Person 
LAGTIMEPP Prior month’s Time per Person 
LAGCHGRCH Prior month’s Change in Reach (i.e., one-month lag in Change in Reach) 
LAGCHGAUD Prior month’s Change in Unique Audience 
LAGCHGVIU Prior month’s Change in Page Views 
LAGCHGPGP Prior month’s Change in Pages per Person 
LAGCHGVPP Prior month’s Change in Visits per Person 
LAGCHGTPP Prior month’s Change in Time per Person 
 
 
 
 
 
* Correlations that are significant at the .10 level are italicized. 
   Correlations that are significant at the .05 level are in bold-faced type. 
   Correlations that are significant at the .01 level are in underlined, bold-faced type. 
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TABLE 4 
RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS  
       
       
       
       
Factor analysis on quarterly web traffic metrics derived from the Nielsen/Netratings database.
       
       
Panel A - Standardized Regression Coefficients        
  Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3 
  "REACH" "Stickiness"  "Loyalty"
Nielsen/Netratings Web Metric      
Unique Audience 0.8242 -0.5659  -0.0004
Total Page Views 0.8795 -0.1457  -0.1434
Visits per Person 0.9140 0.1850  0.1840
Pages per Person 0.7925 0.5592  -0.0704
Time per Person 0.8210 0.5465  -0.0251
% Pageviews from Browser Cache 0.1360 0.0036  0.2249
Reach (% Active Population) 0.8164  -0.5718   0.0050
     
       
Panel B - Rotated Factor Pattern Matrix          
  Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 3 
  "REACH" "Stickiness"  "Loyalty"
Nielsen/Netratings Web Metric      
Unique Audience 0.9679 0.1662  0.1875
Total Page Views 0.7317 0.5252  0.0633
Visits per Person 0.4693 0.7281  0.3915
Pages per Person 0.1618 0.9517  0.1177
Time per Person 0.1831 0.9547  0.1683
% Pageviews from Browser Cache 0.0551 0.0584  0.2503
Reach (% Active Population) 0.9658  0.1557   0.1910
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TABLE 5 
COMPARATIVE 1999 & 2000 REGRESSIONS - MARKET VALUE SCALED BY TOTAL REVENUES 
THE VALUE-RELEVANCE OF THE SUSTAINABILITY OF CURRENT "CASH BURN" 
          
OLS regressions of internet companies' quarterly price-to-sales ratios on accounting variables (scaled 
by total revenues), web traffic factors, and a proxy for the companies' ability to sustain their current rate 
of cash burn. 
The reported results are for regressions on the full sample of firm quarter observations excluding 
observations that were considered to have an undue influence on the determination of the coefficients.  
Observations were excluded if the absolute value of the standardized residual was greater than three 
and/or if the value of the Cook's distance was greater than one.    
          
Dependent Variable:  Market Value of Equity Scaled by Total Revenues     
          
  Coefficient estimates (p-values) 
  1999  2000 
              
Intercept    44.282     48.107
      (.033)       (.0001) 
             
REACH   27.660     22.179
     (.0001)     (.0001) 
             
STICKINESS   38.713     14.051
     (.0001)     (.001) 
             
LOYALTY   -7.891     9.201
      (.553)       (.262) 
             
BURNLEFT    0.2612     1.318
     (.013)     (.028) 
             
BURNnegv    -0.1189     -1.296
      (.776)       (.064) 
             
CGS    -16.129     -31.630
     (.613)     (.042) 
             
MKTGEXP    41.285     5.802
     (.0005)     (.475) 
             
PRODEVLP    112.01     22.147
      (.032)       (.153) 
             
# obs.    118     118
             
White's Chi-Square    59.4     34.93
     (.254)     (.834)
             
Adj.R-squared     32.7%       33.6%
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TABLE 6 
COMPARATIVE 1999 & 2000 REGRESSIONS - MARKET VALUE SCALED BY TOTAL REVENUES 
THE VALUE-RELEVANCE OF ALLIANCES & THE SUSTAINABILITY OF CURRENT "CASH BURN" 
          
OLS regressions of internet companies' quarterly price-to-sales ratios on accounting variables (scaled by 
total revenues), web traffic factors, strategic alliance variables, and a proxy for the companies' ability to 
sustain their current rate of cash burn. 
The reported results are for regressions on the full sample of firm quarter observations excluding 
observations that were considered to have an undue influence on the determination of the coefficients.  
Observations were excluded if the absolute value of the standardized residual was greater than three 
and/or if the value of the Cook's distance was greater than one.        
          
Dependent Variable:  Market Value of Equity Scaled by Total Revenues     
          
  Coefficient estimates (p-values) 
  1999  2000 
             
Intercept    59.327     57.979
     (.003)      (.0001) 
             
REACH   66.457     37.777
    (.0001)     (.0001) 
STICKINESS   40.699     17.080
    (.0001)     (.0002) 
LOYALTY   30.599     19.238
    (.046)     (.034) 
      
BURNLEFT     0.211       1.372
    (.028)     (.024) 
BURNnegv    -0.085     -1.358
     (.825)       (.054) 
             
Top10dummy    -17.970     -2.078
     (.437)     (.859) 
AOLdummy    79.898     -5.634
     (.007)     (.739) 
TotalAlliances    -9.525     -2.477
      (.0001)      (.023) 
             
CGS    11.471     -28.450
     (.703)     (.067) 
MKTGEXP    31.294     5.842
     (.004)     (.475) 
PRODEVLP    76.803     19.158
      (.106)       (.215) 
# obs.    118     118
 
White's Chi-Square    70.38     68.66
     (.598)     (.654)
             
Adj.R-squared     43.6%       35.6%
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TABLE 7A 
1ST QUARTER 2000 REGRESSIONS - MARKET VALUE SCALED BY TOTAL REVENUES 
          
OLS regressions of internet companies' quarterly price-to-sales ratios on accounting variables (scaled by total 
revenues), web traffic factors, strategic alliance variables, and a proxy for the companies' ability to  
sustain their current rate of cash burn. 
          
The reported results are for regressions on the full sample of firm quarter observations excluding  
observations that were considered to have an undue influence on the determination of the coefficients. 
Observations were excluded if the absolute value of the standardized residual was greater than three and/or if  
the value  of the Cook's distance was greater than one.             
          
Dependent Variable:    Market Value of Equity Scaled by Total Revenues     
          
    Coefficient estimates (p-values)    
      1st Quater 2000      
             
Intercept     60.196      
      (.007)      
            
REACH    49.914      
      (.0005)      
STICKINESS    25.278      
      (.001)      
LOYALTY    29.780      
      (.047)      
            
BURNLEFT     1.496      
      (.078)      
BURNnegv     -1.424      
      (.174)      
            
Top10dummy    -2.912      
      (.883)      
AOLdummy    -45.599      
      (.206)      
TotalAlliances    -3.526      
      (.045)      
            
CGS    -19.304      
      (.414)      
MKTGEXP    12.987      
      (.457)      
PRODEVLP    72.635      
      (.072)      
# obs.     58      
White's Chi-Square     58.88      
     (.517)      
            
Adj.R-squared       37.1%       
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TABLE 7B 
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE RESIDUALS FROM  Q1 2000 VALUATION REGRESSION 
AND THE PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN P/S RATIOS IN Q2 2000 (N=48) 
          
  
  
          
                
    RESIDUAL FROM Q1   % CHG IN P/S RATIO Q2       
                
RESIDUAL FROM Q1  1.000  -0.286     
     (0.0487)     
          
% CHG IN P/S RATIO Q2    1.000     
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TABLE 8 
DETERMINANTS OF THE SHAKEOUT 
          
OLS regressions of the change in B2C companies' price-to-sales ratios from Q1 to Q2 of 2000 on the 
residuals from the Q1 2000 regression and other predicted determinants of shakeout. 
  
The reported results are for regressions on the full sample of firm quarter observations excluding  
observations that were considered to have an undue influence on the determination of the coefficients. 
Observations were excluded if the absolute value of the standardized residual was greater than three 
and/or if the value  of the Cook's distance was greater than one.      
          
          
Dependent Variable:    Percentage Change in Price-to-Sales Ratio     
          
     Coefficient estimates (p-values)     
            
            
Intercept     -1.695      
      (.419)      
            
AGE    0.003      
      (.0001)      
            
logMV    0.013      
      (.906)      
            
ETAIL    -0.652      
      (.1163)      
            
CASHQLFT     -0.005      
      (.665)      
            
RESIDQ1     -0.007      
      (.085)      
            
# obs.     47      
            
White's Chi-Square     21.87      
      (.291)      
            
Adj.R-squared       33.8%       
 
